The Development and Effectiveness of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
1 October 2001
By Dr. Faten Sabry
GATT has a grim record in settling trade disputes especially when a developed country is involved, or so it seems if we examine the rate of compliance to GATT's rulings. Once may argue that it was due to the rules governing the dispute settlement process. Until the Uruguay Rough of trade negotiations concluded in 1993, much of GATT's business was conducted by consensus. Each country had a veto power, which reduced the effectiveness of GATT and especially the GATT dispute settlement procedure.
Now that the rules have changed, has the World Trade Organization (WTO) become a more decisive third-party capable of settling disputes and enforcing its rulings?
The purpose of this article is to: 1) study the effectiveness of the dispute settlement body (DSB) of the WTO in resolving trade disputes under the new rules, and the role this new institution is likely to play in promoting cooperation; and 2) examine the role of the domestic pressures facing nations in the case of a trade dispute. This paper analyzes the first case that was handled under the new rules to illustrate the impact of the change in the rules governing the DSB on resolving disputes, and to show how international and domestic pressures interact to shape the outcome.
This article was published in the MSU-DCL Journal of International Law.
