The Two Sides of Platform Collusion

20 July 2021
Dr. Alexandre Carbonnel

The recent decision of the French Competition Authority regarding the meal vouchers market has put a spotlight on the assessment of collusion in two-sided markets.

In “The Two Sides of Platform Collusion,” Associate Director Dr. Alexandre Carbonnel discusses key findings in economic literature relating to collusive strategies in two-sided markets and the effects of platform collusion on users.

The paper also highlights: 

  • The specificities of two-sided markets;
  • The asymmetric effect of collusion on prices from both sides of the market;
  • The effects of collusion on prices and its misguided approach in two-sided markets;
  • How to account for the consequences of collusion on cross-group externalities; and
  • A case-by-case assessment of the effects of collusion, considering the specificities of the market.
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